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Introduction
The common-law tort of negligence arises when a person, who
owes a duty of care to another,1 breaches that duty2 and reasonably
foreseeable harm or loss is caused by the breach of duty.3 Illegality is
a general defence. It is, therefore, a defence available to a defendant
in a negligence action. This is shown by cases like Ashton v Turner,4
Pitts v Hunt5 and Clunis v Camden and Islington Health Authority. 6
This paper considers its application to negligence in English
law. Although the defence is to be applauded because of its very
appealing justification, which centres around public policy (in terms
of preserving the integrity of the legal system and preventing affront
to the public conscience), it seems now to be a troubled concept
because of the controversy generated by the stem approach to it. The
courts have, therefore, imposed limitations on it and there have been
calls for reform of the law relating to it. This paper is aimed at
contributing to the literature? by exposing this troubled concept
again but with particular reference to negligence in English law
because the majority of recently decided cases on the application to
tort of this general defence are cases on negligence. The paper looks,
1 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562; Capara Industries pic v Dickman [1990] I All ER 568.
2 Condon v Basi [1985] 2 All ER 453; Latimer v AEC Ltd. [1953] AC 643.
3 The Wagon Mound [1961] AC 388; Pickford v Imperial Chemical Industries [1998] 3 All ER 462;
Chester v Afihar [2004] UKHL 41; [2005] 1 AC 134.
4 [1981] QB 137.
5 [1990] 3 All ER 344.
6 [1998] 3 All ER 180. Contributory negligence and consent (volenti) are also defences to negligence.
7 See, eg, T Hervey, "Caveat Criminal is", (1981) 97 LQR 537; C Debattista, "Ex turpi causa returns to
the English Law of Torts: Taking advantage of a wrong way out", (1984) Anglo-Am LR 15;
K Williams, "Defences for Drunken Drivers: Public Policy on the Roads and in the Air", (1991) 54
MLR 745; B Rodger, "Ex Turpi: A Location-driven Defence?", (1998) Jur Rev 201; R Glofcheski,
"Plaintiffs Illegality as a Bar to Recovery of Personal Injury Damages", (1999) 19 LS, 6; and The Law
Commission, The Illegality Defence in Tort, Consultation Paper No 160 (London: The Stationery
Office, 2001).
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inter alia, at the relevant leading cases in this jurisdiction and
argues, as regards negligence, that it would be inappropriate for the
defence of illegality to be replaced by contributory negligence or
consent, and that the defence ought to be retained and refined rather
than be abolished. It is divided into six parts, namely: (a) the
meaning of the defence, (b) its basis, (c) its application to
negligence, (d) the various approaches to it, (e) its limits and (f)
suggestions for reform.
(a) Meaning ofthe defence
Put simply, the defence of illegality means that a person cannot rely
on their illegal act or conduct to found an action against another
person. The Latin maxim, "ex turpi causa non oritur actio", 8
meaning "out of an illegal act there can be no cause of action", sums
it Up.9 Therefore, for example, where in the course of blowing a bank
safe, one of the burglars is negligent and the ensuing explosion
injures his fellow burglar, the latter's claim against the former ought
not to succeed10 (although the claim could also be denied on the
basis of voluntary assumption of risk, ie, valenti).
But, then, does the claimant's act/conduct have to be criminal?
The defence seems to be not limited to criminal acts by the claimant
because in Kirkham v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester
Police11 the Court of Appeal stated that it could apply to immoral
behaviour, too. In Euro-Diam Ltd v Bathurst12 Kerr LJ also used the
expression, "immoral conduct," when referring to the defence. In
8 An equivalent Latin phrase, "ex dolo malo non oritur actio," was used by Lord Mansfield in Holman
v Johnson (1775) 1 Cowp. 341, 343; 98 ER 1120, 1121. His Lordship had said earlier, in Montefiori v
Montefiori (1762) 1 Wm BI 364, that "no man shall set up his own iniquity as a defence, anymore than
as a cause of action." Similarly, Wilmot LJ, in Collins v Elantern «1767) 2 Wilson 341, 350; 95 Eng.
Rep. 847, 852 (KB)), said: "No polluted hand shall touch the pure fountains ofjustice." Another related
maxim is "allegans :wam turpitudinem non est audiendus" ("a person alleging his own wrongdoing is
not to be heard").
9 Although Tony Weir loosely interprets the maxim as "bad men get less", we would replace "get less"
with "should get nothing" because "get less" seems to take it for granted that they should get
something, which does not always happen (see, eg, Ashton v Turner and Clunis).
10 A similar example was given by Mason CJ in Gala v Preston [1991] 100 ALR 29,36. See also Pitts
v Hunt [1990] 3 All ER 344.
II [1990] 3 All ER 246, 251 (per Lloyd LJ).
12 [1988] 2 All ER 23
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fact, according to the Law Commission, there are three possible
interpretations of "illegal conduct" in this respect, namely: (a) a
breach of the criminal law, (b) a breach of the civil law and (c)
immoral behaviour. 13 So, the wrongdoing in question is clearly not
restricted to a criminal wrong because it also includes a civil wrong
and immoral behaviour.
(b) Basis of the defence
What, then, is the basis of the maxim, ex turpi causa non
oritur actio? In other words, why should a person, who, for example,
is injured by the negligent act of another person while he himself is
doing an "illegal" act, not be allowed to sue that negligent person
successfully? It is public policy, which justifies, and is the raison
d'etre of, the maxim. This may be explained in two ways at least.
First, allowing a claimant to profit from his/her illegal conduct
would constitute an affront to the public conscience l4 - it would be
tantamount to aiding or rewarding a criminal and would, therefore,
bring the law into disrepute. I5 Secondly, the defence preserves the
integrity of the legal system for the same reason, ie, the desirability
of not allowing a claimant in a civil action to obtain "profit" from an
illegal act. 16
A good illustration is Pitts v Hunt, a case involving two
youths, who had been drinking, had set off home on a motorbike
(driven by one of them with the claimant riding pillion and
encouraging the driver, whom he knew was drunk, under-age,
unlicensed and uninsured, to drive so recklessly as to frighten other
road-users). An accident occurred, as a result of which the claimant
was seriously injured and the driver/defendant was killed. The
claimant's action failed because of the defence of illegality. Whereas
Balcombe LJ thought that the nature of the joint illegal enterprise
made it impossible for the court to determine the standard of care
appropriate in the circumstances, Dillon LJ considered that the
13 Law Comm., op cit, para 3 (1.12).
14 Pitts v Hunt; see also Vellino v Chief Constable o(Creater Manchester Police [2001] EWCA Civ
1249; [2002] 1 WLR 218.
15 See T. Hervey, Caveat Criminalis, (1981) 97 LQR 537, 539.
16 This is in line with the maxim, "nul/us commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria" ("no one
should be allowed to profit from his own wrong").
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action should fail because it arose directly ex turpi causa and
Beldam LJ thought that to allow the claim would be contrary to
public policy and an affront to the public conscience.
The two aspects or expressions of the justification for the
defence can be seen clearly in the following statement by Kerr LJ in
Euro-Diam Ltd v Bathurst: 17
The ex turpi causa defence ultimately rests on a
principle of public policy that the courts will not assist a
plaintiff who has been guilty of illegal (or immoral)
conduct of which the courts should take notice. It applies
if, in all the circumstances, it would be an affront to the
public conscience to grant the relief which he seeks
because the courts would thereby appear to assist or
encourage the plaintiff in his illegal conduct or to
encourage others in similar acts.
Six years after that case, however, in Tinsley v Milligan!~ the
House of Lords disapproved of the notion of affront to the public
conscience being relied on as the basis of the maxim, ex turpi causa
non oritur actio. Nevertheless, a few years later, Kerr LJ's statement
was described in Reeves v Commissioner of Police for the
Metropoli/9 by Buxton LJ as still "a valuable guide to the basis of
the defence.,,20
The exposition of Kerr LJ in Euro-Diam Ltd. v Bathurst also
concerns the issue of deterrence as a goal of the defence: the courts
would like people to be discouraged from doing, and then relying
on, unlawful acts in order to make a claim against others?! The
problem with deterrence here, however, is whether it can be claimed
with certainty that the defence of illegality will deter criminal acts by
claimants or that the abolition of that defence will deter criminal or
17 [1988] 2All ER 23 at 28-29; [1990] 1QB I at 35.
'" [!994] 1AC 340.
19 [1998] 2All ER 381.
20 It must be noted that in Reeves the House of Lords ([200 I] AC 360) did not deal with the ex turpi
defence.
21 Indeed, long ago in 1938, in Beresford v Royal Insurance Co Ltd [1938] 2All ER 602 at 607, [1938]
AC 586 at 598-599, Lord Atkin said that the effect of the maxim was "to act as a deterrent to crime".
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negligent acts by defendants.
Another problem facing deterrence as a goal of the defence of
illegality is that most criminal actors do not expect, while doing the
criminal act, to be injured by someone else's negligence etc; they
would, therefore, hardly be influenced by the thought of the defence
barring their claim. In the case of minors, acting on impulse, this
would surely seem to be true.22
It may well be argued that the law of tort should not interfere
with the role of the criminal law, which includes punishment,
deterrence, etc.23 However, considering that the criminal law does
not deter in all cases, if the law of tort can, in certain circumstances,
complement the criminal law, that should be deemed appropriate.
Although the same may be said of the goal of retribution or
punishment, the problem with the latter is that strict application of
the defence in order to punish claimants for their unlawful act so as
to deny their claim would mean treatment of them as outlaws24 even
if the unlawful act is not a crime, eg, trespass to another's land.
Kerr LJ's statement, in Euro-Diam Ltd. v Bathurst, that the
defence will apply "if in all the circumstances it would be an affront
to the public conscience if, by affording him the relief sought, the
court was seen to be indirectly assisting the plaintiff in his criminal
act," suggests that the criminal conduct in question must be, not a
trivial one but rather, a serious one, capable of constituting an affront
to the public conscience in the event of a successful claim by the
wrongdoing claimant. This is supported by the words of Sir Murray
Stuart-Smith in Vellino v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester:
"Generally speaking a crime punishable with imprisonment could be
expected to qualify".25
Although the defence runs counter to one of the aims of
damages in tort (ie, compensation of the claimant) since its
application has the effect of cancelling out the claimant's action or
making it unsuccessful, the appeal of its justification cannot be
22 See, eg, J H King Jr, "Outlaws and Outlier Doctrines: The Serious Misconduct Bar in Tort Law", 43
(2002), Wm and Mary L. Rev., p 1045.
2J See, eg, the Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 142, which identifies the purposes of sentencing as
punishment of offenders, reduction of crime by deterrence etc, reform and rehabilitation of offenders,
protection of the public and reparation by offenders to their victims.
24 This issue is discussed below in the section on limits of the defence.
25 [2002] 1 WLR 218 at 236.
4\
ignored. The public conscience is generally so highly esteemed that
not much support, if any, is likely to be given to anyone who
. 26
outrages It.
One interesting question, in relation to public policy, is
whether the defence (of illegality) should apply where, owing to the
defendant's negligence, the claimant is unable to do something that
is illegal. That issue arose in Rance v Mid-Downs Health Authority?7
In that case the claimants, a married couple, alleged that, owing to
the negligence of the defendants, a foetal abnormality was not
detected during the course of the woman's pregnancy, and that
deprived her of the opportunity of having an abortion. It was held
that abortion of a foetus capable of being born alive would have
been unlawful under the Abortion Act 1967 then applicable and, so,
it was not possible to found a cause of action against the hospital.
Accordingly, it would be contrary to public policy to allow the
claimants to recover in those circumstances. This decision ought to
be applauded because the circumstances in question were such that
the claimants had lost the opportunity to violate the provisions of a
statute then in force and their claim had been based on their having
been deprived of that opportunity.
(c) Application to negligence
There are two aspects of the defence's application to
negligence. The first is where the claimant is the only person who
did the illegal/immoral act, and the second where both the claimant
and the defendant are involved in a joint criminal enterprise.
i) Criminal/immoral act by claimant only
Two clear illustrations of this are Clunis v Camden and
Islington Health Authority28 and Sacco v Chief Constable of South
26 Therefore, it was not surprising when, after the Court of Appeal had decided in Revill v Newbery
([1996] 1 AJI ER 291) that the defence of iJlegality did not apply, the damages payable by the
defendant to the claimant were paid by a newspaper fund, promptly and wiJlingly contributed to by
members of the public. That case was decided on the basis of the Occupiers' Liability Act 1984.
27 [1991] I AJI ER 801.
28 [1988] 3 AJI ER 180; [1998]2 WLR 902.
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Wales Constabulary?9 In Clunis a former mental patient, after
discharge from hospital, had stabbed a man to death in a place to
which the public had access, Finsbury Park Underground Station in
North London. His negligence claim against the responsible health
authority (for breaching their duty to him by failing to give him after-
care, which he needed) was not entertained by both the High Court
and Court of Appeal because of the maxim, ex turpi causa non oritur
actio - his claim arose out of a criminal offence which he himself had
committed.30
Sacco concerned a 17-year-old claimant, who had been arrested
following a brawl. While he was being taken to the police station in a
police van, travelling at 25 miles per hour, he kicked open the door of
the van and jumped out. He hit his head on the road and sustained
injuries. His action failed because of his own illegality, ie, attempting
to escape from lawful custody. He was simply the author of his own
injury or misfortune.
Sacco was followed and applied in Vellino v Chief Constable of
Greater Manchester. 3! The facts in Vellino were similar to those in
Sacco in that the claimants in both cases were injured while
attempting to escape from lawful custody. However, the claimant in
Vellino, unlike the claimant in Sacco, was a known burglar with a
history of escaping from custody and the Court of Appeal held there
that the police did not owe him a duty to take care that he did not get
injured in his attempt to escape from lawful custody.
(ii) Claimant and defendant involved in a joint criminal
enterprise
In Sacc032 Schiemann LJ restated this aspect nicely III the
following way:
29 (1998) Unreported.
30 His mental state did not justify a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity (in fact he had pleaded guilty
to manslaughter on the ground of diminished responsibility and been sent to a special hospital) so that he
had to be presumed to have known what he was doing (ie. killing a person) and that it was wrong. This
case is further discussed under "Approaches to the concept in negligence". below.
31 [2002] 1 WLR 218.
32 (Unreported) 15 May 1998. a case which concerned criminal/immoral conduct by only the claimant.
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It is common ground that the policy of the law is not to
permit one criminal to recover damages from a fellow
criminal who fails to take care of him whilst they are
both engaged on a criminal enterprise. The reason for
that rule is not the law's tenderness toward the criminal
defendant, but the law's unwillingness to afford a
criminal plaintiff a remedy in such circumstances.
An earlier example is Ashton v Turner,33 where the claimant and the
defendant, both involved in a burglary, were leaving the scene of the
crime in a car, driven by the defendant, with the police in hot pursuit
when the defendant negligently crashed the car and the claimant was
injured. The claim was met successfully with the defence of
illegality. Another example of this is Pitts v Hunt. 34 Regarding these
decisions, it is worth pointing out that it may be too harsh to deny
every claim on the first indication of wrongful conduct. However, it
is undesirable and unacceptable for the law to be seen as assisting a
wrongdoing claimant.
Nevertheless, in a Canadian Supreme Court case, Hall v
Hebert/ 5 where the facts were broadly similar to those in Pitts v
Hunt (the defendant and the claimant were both drunk at the time of
the injury and the claimant sued the defendant for negligence in
allowing him in a drunken state to drive the defendant's car, which
went off the road and rolled over, as a result of which the claimant
suffered head injuries), the court allowed the claim but found the
claimant 50% contributorily negligent. So, there the defence did not
apply. According to McLachlin J, the defence, inter alia, ought to
apply in tort only where the integrity of the legal system must be
preserved and, so, it should not apply to personal injuries actions
since in those cases a claimant does not seek profit. The Law
Commission, also, in its Consultation Paper on the Defence, for the
same reason, expressed doubt about the application of the defence to
l · . 36persona mJury cases.
33 [1980]3 WLR 736, QBD; [1981] QB 137.
34 See section on "Basis of the defence", above.
35 (1993) 2 SCR 159.
36 See Law Commission, The Illegality Defence in Tort, No 160,2001, paras 4.36-4.47 and 5.24-5.34.
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It must be said, with respect, however, that there are problems
with that view. First, that view presents no answer to the situation
where, for example, an illegal worker is injured at his workplace as a
result of the negligence of a co-worker. In such a situation the injury
and the illegality are closely connected and, so, even though the
claim is a personal injuries one, the defence should apply so as to bar
it; its basis is the unlawful conduct (working illegally). If the defence
does not apply in such circumstances, then the result is likely to be,
in our opinion, an affront to the public conscience because the law
would then be, or be seen to be, giving assistance to the wrongdoer.
That would affect negatively the good name of the law. Another
difficulty with that view, as, indeed, pointed out by Jones, is that,
given that all tort damages, except exemplary damages, are aimed at
compensating the claimant, "logically, if the defence is only relevant
where the court is seeking to deprive the claimant of a 'profit', it
would never apply in tort".37
(d) Approaches to the concept in negligence
Two broad approaches to the defence in relation to
negligence38 may be identified from the decided cases: (i) the stem,
traditionalist approach (variations of which are the negation-of-
negligence approach and the reliance-on-the-illegality approach),
and (ii) the flexible approach (which expressly permits judicial
discretion in individual cases).
(i) The stern, traditionalist approach
This is the uncompromising approach, the one favoured by
public moralists. It is that, traditionally, a claimant's illegal act
automatically disqualifies their claim. It is evident, especially, where
both claimant and defendant are involved in a joint criminal
enterprise and the claimant is injured in the course of that enterprise,
as happened in Ashton v Turner. 39 Support for this viewpoint may
be found in two cases reported in 1977, both involving Lord
37 M A Jones, Texthook on Torts, 8th ed (Oxford Univ. Press, 2(03), p 614.
3S As well as other torts.
w [1981] QS 137.
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Denning. In the first case, Cummings v Grainger, 40 Lord Denning
suggested that the claim by a burglar, bitten by a guard dog, might be
barred by the defence of illegality. Moreover, His Lordship made, in
Murphy v Culhane,41 a similar statement:
.. . suppose a burglar breaks into a house and the
householder, finding him there, picks up a gun and
shoots him - using more force, maybe, than is
reasonably necessary. The householder may be guilty of
manslaughter ... But I doubt very much whether the
burglar's widow could have an action for damages. The
householder might well have a defence ... on the ground
of ex turpi causa non oritur actio . ..
Sacco is another case which clearly illustrates this rigid
approach although, in that case, only the claimant was involved in
the illegal act, on which his claim was based, as already stated.
The negation-of-negligence approach is a variation of the stem,
rigid approach. It places an automatic bar on a claimant's claim
against the defendant where the two are involved in a joint criminal
enterprise. This, in effect, reduces judicial discretion. A typical
example is where a duty of care is denied. Thus, according to
Eubank J in Ashton v Turner,42 the courts, in certain circumstances,
may not, because of public policy, "recognise the existence of a duty
of care by one participant in a crime to another participant in the
same crime, in relation to an act done in connection with the
commission of that crime.,,43 A further example is where the
appropriate standard of care cannot be set and, therefore, no
negligence is found, as in Pitts v Hunt.44
Another variant of the rigid approach is the reliance-on-the-
illegality approach. Does the claimant have to rely on the illegality
40 [1977] 1 All ER 104, 109.
41 [1977] QS 94, 98.
42 [1981] QS 137.
43 See also the two Australian cases, Smith v Jenkins (1970) 44 ALJR 78, and Progress and Properties
Ltd v Croji (1976) 51 ALJR 184.
44 See also Jackson v Harrison (1978) 19 ALR 129, and Gala v Preston (199\) 100 ALR 29 (High
Court of Australia).
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to assert his claim? If so, the claim will fail. Thus, in Clunis the
Court of Appeal held, inter alia, that, because the claimant's claim
had been based essentially on his own illegal act of manslaughter,
public policy dictated that the claim should not be allowed to
succeed.
This is, however, challengeable in the light of the Court of
Appeal's decision in Reeves.45 There, Buxton LJ's approach was that
stated by Kerr LJ in his exposition in Euro-Diam Ltd v Bathurst.46 If
the Court of Appeal had adopted that approach in Clunis, it would
have been faced with the question whether it would be an affront to
the public conscience and appear to encourage the claimant or others
if the court held that the maxim did not apply. According to
Kennedy, since Clunis was severely mentally disordered and, "ex
hypothesi, beyond rational encouragement," there might not have
been an affront to the public conscience had the maxim not been
applied. Just as, in Reeves, the alleged turpitude (suicide) was
exactly the act which the defendants, the "Police", had a duty to
prevent, in Clunis the alleged act of turpitude (uncontrolled
aggression resulting in homicide) was what the defendants were
arguably under a duty to prevent by providing the claimant with
after-care. Therefore, just as the maxim was held not to apply in
Reeves, it might not have been held to apply in Clunis if the Court of
Appeal had considered this argument based on Kerr LJ's statement
in Euro-Diam Ltd v Bathurst.47
Other objections to the defence in negligence are that (a) it
results in double jeopardy and (b) it is self-defeating where the
claimant and the defendant are involved in a joint criminal venture.
The defence results in double punishment where, for example, A and
8 are co-burglars and 8's negligence in the course of the burglary
causes serious personal injuries to A and A sues B. If the defence is
applied, A's first punishment will be that his action will fail and he
will get no damages for his negligently caused injuries; his second
punishment would then be having to live without any compensation
or spending the rest of his days in a wheelchair if B's negligence
45 [200 I] AC 360, where, as already noted, the ex turpi defence was not dealt with by the House of
Lords.
46 Ante.
47 See I Kennedy, "Negligence: Duty of Care", Med Law Rev, (1998), vol 6, no I, pp 108-112.
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causes him to be paralysed.48
The defence may also be self-defeating because, if the
justification for it is the desirability of not allowing a person to profit
from his crime/wrong or not assisting a criminal in his civil suit
where the crime and injury are inextricably intertwined, then, in the
example above, whereas A's claim will be disallowed, 8 will be
rewarded in a way by not being held liable for his negligent act,
done during the commission of a crime.49
(ii) The flexible approach
This is the approach which allows judicial discretion in
individual cases (of negligence, etc.). It bases the ex turpi defence on
the broad concept of what would be an affront to the public
conscience or that of the court. It is a forceful one and also appealing
because, instead of restricting the court, it enables it to consider all
relevant circumstances and, therefore, to make sensible and just
decisions, thereby avoiding arbitrary and disproportionate ones.
Kirkham v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester illustrates this
approach. There the claimant's husband, a suicidal alcoholic, killed
himself while on remand in custody. Even though his wife had
informed the police that he had attempted to kill himself previously,
the police failed to notify the prison authorities. His widow sued the
police in negligence. The Court of Appeal held that the police were
liable and that the ex turpi defence did not apply, suicide being no
longer an offence. Similarly in Reeves v Metropolitan Police
Commissioner, where, as already mentioned, the ex turpi defence
was not dealt with by the House of Lords, the Court of Appeal held
that the deceased's suicide did not bar a claim based on his death.
Therefore, apart from the fact that suicide is morally wrong,
the flexible approach, adopted by the court in Kirkham, actually
enabled the court to exercise its discretion in considering whether
allowing the claim, based on the deceased's suicide, would
constitute an affront to the public conscience or not. In the event the
court decided that it would not affront the public conscience.
48 See R A Prentice. "Of Tort Refonn and Millionaire Muggers: Should An Obscure Equitable Doctrine
Be Revived To Dent the Litigation Crisis?", 32 San Diego L. Rev., Winter 1995, p 118.
49 Ibid. In this example we see also that the defence can discourage commencement of negligence
actions by criminals. They would be very unlikely to bring a claim if it meant owning up to a serious
crime or ifthe action is based on their criminal act.
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(e) Limits of the defence
Strict application of the maxim could, however, lead to
injustice at times, thereby posing a problem for the law.50 For this
reason certain limitations have been imposed on the defence by the
courts. The limitations on it (which apply to other torts as well as
negligence) are: (i) the injury must be closely connected with the
claimant's illegal act, and (ii) the defendant must not have used
excessive force.
The injury and the claimant's illegal act must be closely linked
The injury must be closely connected with the illegal act so as
to be virtually a part of it (or must be a direct, uninterrupted
consequence of the illegal act). So, it is not enough that the
claimant's conduct is technically wrongful. There must be some
close connection between his conduct and his injury. Thus, in Hall v
Woolston Hall Leisure Lt(f! Peter Gibson LJ stated that the right
approach:
... should be to consider whether the applicant's claim
arises out of or is so clearly connected or inextricably
bound up or linked with the illegal conduct of the
applicant that the court could not permit the applicant to
recover compensation without appearing to condone that
conduct.
This close connection may be illustrated by Vakante v Addey and
Stanhope School. 52 In that case the appellant, who had been
precluded from working without a permit while his application for
asylum was being considered, went to work illegally as a graduate
trainee teacher, contrary to the Immigration Act 1971, section 24; he
also made fraudulent statements about his employment status so as
to receive state benefits. The Court ofAppeal, therefore, held that his
complaint of unfair dismissal and discrimination was barred by
50 Automatic application of the maxim would also be tantamount to displacement ofjudicial discretion.
51 [2001] ICR 99, at 111-2.
52 [2004] EWCA Civ 1065; [2004] 4 All ER 1056.
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illegal conduct, which was clearly connected or inextricably bound
up with his claim.53 As regards negligence, specifically, such a link
was also evident in Clunis, Ashton v Turner and Pitts v Hunt, etc.
However, in Revill v Newbery,54 there was a different result.
There the claimant and his friend were about to burgle the
defendant's shed on his allotment when the claimant was shot by the
defendant, who was then sleeping in that shed. The Court of Appeal
held that the defendant breached his duty to the claimant by the use
of unreasonable, disproportionate force, and also that the claimant
was contributorily negligent. The Court, however, did not directly
answer one relevant question: What was the claimant doing at the
time of the injury? If the Court had considered that question, the
answer would have been, most probably, "an illegal act" (attempting
to burgle). A further pertinent question would have been whether he
would have been shot by the defendant if he had not attempted to
burgle the defendant's shed.55
The defendant must not have used excessive force
Where excessive force is used by the defendant, the defence
should not apply.56 Without this limitation all claims by trespassers
or criminals will be barred, irrespective of how excessive or
unreasonable the force against them is. So, for the defence to
succeed, there must be proportionality between the claimant's
conduct and the defendant's act. 57 In other words, the force used by
the defendant should not be out of all proportion to the claimant's
unlawful conduct.
In fact, in Revill v Newbery,58 it was in the judgement of the
High Court (rather than of the Court of Appeal) that we see both
limits of the defence of illegality restated: the close interweaving of
53 To allow his claim would be to condoue the illegality. It is thought, for the same reason, that the
same result would have been reached ifhe had been injured by his employer's negligence.
54[1996] I All ER 291.
55 That apart, what did not help the defendant was the fact that he anticipated burglars and, therefore,
waited, equipped with a gun, which is totally different from the position of a surprised householder.
56 See the judgement of Millett LJ in Revill v Newbery.
57 Bingham LJ made a similar statement in Saunders v Edwards [1987]2 All ER 651,665-6.
58 Per Rougier J.
50
the claim/injury in the illegal act and the requirement of
proportionality. There, according to Rougier J, "the discharge of a
shotgun towards burglars who are not displaying any intention of
resorting to violence to the person" was "out of all proportion to the
threat involved" and, accordingly, "any injury" inflicted by such
discharge could not be "an integral part or a necessarily direct
consequence of the burglary". That view seems logical indeed.
Nevertheless, it, too, like the Court of Appeal, fails to answer the
question whether, if the claimant had not attempted to burgle the
defendant's shed, he would have been shot by the defendant. 59
Today there is the principle60 that no person becomes a "caput
lupinum" (which literally means "outlaw") in the eyes of the civil
law simply because they were engaged in some unlawful act.6l Thus,
it has been pointed out that the defence of illegality poses the danger
of effectively throwing the principle aside by not allowing
wrongdoing claimants to succeed in their claim62 and, therefore,
treating them as outlaws. Accordingly, Evans LJ stated, in Revill v
Newbery, that it was one thing to deny claimants any fruits from
their illegal act, but a different and far more extensive thing to
deprive them of even compensation for injuries they were otherwise
entitled to recover at law (in other words, to treat them as outlaws).
It must, however, be mentioned that the Court of Appeal's decision
in Revill v Newbery was restricted, not to negligence but, to the
Occupiers' Liability Act 1984, which does not state illegality as a
defence under it.
But, why should the law protect wrongdoers just to avoid their
being treated as outlaws? Wrongdoing is undeniably improper and
immoral. So, why should the law support it or be seen as doing so?
59 It is interesting to note that in one Australian case, Hackl'haw v Shaw (1985) 3 ALR 417, on facts
similar to those in Revill v Newbery, the ex turpi defence was not mentioned in the rationes decidendi
but, instead, the claimant was held to have been 40% contributorily negligent. Similarly, in a Canadian
case, Bigcharles v Merkel [1973] 1 WWR 324, where a security guard shot and killed a burglar on
commercial premises, contributory negligence was found on the part of the burglar. Those two
Commonwealth cases were not cited to the Court of Appeal in Revill v Newbery,
60 Hereinafter referred to as the "outlaw principle".
61 Henword v Municipal Tramways Trust [1938] 60 CLR, 438 at 466. See also T Hervey, "Caveat
Criminalis", (1981) 97 LQR 537,541. For the origins of the concept of "caput lupinum" see Frederick
Pollock and Frederic W Maitland, History ofEnglish Law Before the Time ofEdward 1, 2"d edn (1898),
p 449 and n I; see also William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws ofEngland (1769) (Cambridge
Univ, Press, 1919), p 315.
62 See, eg, Jones, op cit p 612.
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The only exception to this is where the wrongdoing is trivial, eg,
where a claimant, driving a car with faulty brakes, is injured as a
result of a collision caused by another driver's negligence.63
The outlaw principle ought not to be adhered to where the
unlawful act in question is inextricably bound with, or connected to,
the claimant's claim. This is especially so where the claimant and the
defendant are involved in an illegal joint venture because, if a person
is allowed by the law to rely on his unlawful act to sue successfully
or to found a cause of action out of their own illegal act,64 that would
constitute an affront to the public conscience and negatively affect
the integrity of the legal system.65
So, one can say that the purpose of the requirement of a causal
connection between the claimant's conduct and the defendant's
negligence is to prevent harshness in the law and injustice to the
defendant. This further weakens the argument that no one should
become an outlaw in the eyes of the civil law simply because they
have done an unlawful act.
Granted that the defence has an appealing justification and that
there are limitations on it, there is now a dilemma facing the courts.
First, the law must not be seen as aiding the criminal/wrong-doer
(because that would undermine the integrity of the justice system).
But, at the same time, the defence should not be applied rigidly,
regardless of how serious or disproportionate the claimant's injury or
loss is to their unlawful conduct.
Since, as shown above, it cannot be denied that the defence
has some unsatisfactory features, the following section will now
look at suggestions for reform of the law relating to its application to
negligence.
(I) Reform suggestions
The suggestions for reform may be grouped under two
headings: those not made by the Law Commission and those made
by the Law Commission.
6] See Sedley LJ's dissenting judgement in Vellino v Chiej'Constahle oj'Greater Manchester [2001] 1
WLR218.
64 See, eg, Pitts v Hunt, ante.
65 This argument also applies in the case of a burglar shot by a householder.
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Suggestions not made by the Law Commission
In the first group of suggestions (ie, those not made by the
Law Commission) are calls for abolition of the defence because of
the availability of either contributory negligence or consent against
claimants. Supporters of contributory negligence include Sedley LJ66
and McLachlan J67. The problem with this view, however, is that in
English law contributory negligence is not a total defence; rather, it
is only a partial defence. According to the Law Reform
(Contributory Negligence) Act 1945, section 1(1), the court has
power to reduce a claimant's damages "to such extent as the court
thinks just and equitable having regard to the claimant's share in the
responsibility of the damage". The word, "share", therefore, implies
that the defence is not total. Besides, in Pitts v Hunt the Court of
Appeal made it clear that there could not be 100% contributory
negligence. Therefore, since illegality is a total defence but
contributory negligence is only a partial defence, it would be
inappropriate for the defence of illegality to be replaced by
contributory negligence.
Glofcheski also advocates outright abolition of the ex turpi
defence because its role can be played by consent (valenti), for
example.6s As regards the tort of negligence, however, this is not a
good suggestion because illegality and valenti are different
defences69 even if there may be certain circumstances where the
same set of facts may give rise to both defences.7o
The Law Commission's proposals
There are also the proposals of the Law Commission, made in
66 See Vellino, ante.
67 See Hall v Hehert, ante.
" See R Glofcheski, op cit, pp 6-23.
64 Even the maxims relating to them ("ex turpi causa non orilur actio", ie, "out of an illegal act there
can be no cause of action" and "volenti non}it injuria", ie, "that to which a person consents cannot be
considered an injury") clearly do not mean the same thing (See L B Curzon, Dictionary ofLaw (Pitman
Publishing, 1995)).
70 See Vellino, ante. For example, it: during a professional boxing contest, a boxer, who works part-
time as a model, is punched in the face and sustains a cut on his lip which swells up badly, volenti may
be pleaded against him ifhe sues his opponent. Illegality, however, will clearly not apply.
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2001. 71 In their paper the Commission recommended, inter alia, that
the present law be replaced by a structured discretion to bar a claim
arising from, or connected to, an illegal act by the claimant. The
discretion to bar a claim must depend on: (a) the seriousness of the
illegality,n (b) claimant's knowledge and intention, (c) whether
denial of relief would act as a deterrent, (d) whether denial of relief
would further the purpose of the rule which renders the claimant's
act illegal, and (e) whether denial of relief would be proportionate to
the illegality involved.73
These reform proposals by the Commission are quite laudable
in the present writer's opinion because they are not against retention
of the defence. lt is felt that the defence ought to be retained on the
grounds that the automatic bar to an action by one co-criminal
against the other (eg, Ashton v Turner) and the limitations imposed
on it make it more acceptable in the interests of justice and
preservation of the integrity of the law.
lt would be inappropriate, therefore, to call for judicial or
legislative repeal of the defence of ex turpi just because there are
some problems with it. To abolish the defence under such
circumstances would be like throwing away the baby with the bath
water just because the latter is no longer "clean". Rather, the present
state of the law should be improved by making the defence much
more acceptable. There are already two potent limitations on it in
English law: close connection between the injury/harm and the
illegality, and secondly, proportionality, as already stated. The next
step is, in the interests of fairness and consistency in the future and
as proposed by the Law Commission, for judicial discretion to be
increased so that judges would have to take into consideration, when
deciding whether the defence should apply or not, factors such as the
seriousness of the offence/illegality by the claimant, and the
claimant's knowledge and intention.
71 Law Commission, The Illegality Defence in Tort (Consultation Paper 160 (200 I)).
72 So, eg, a driver, not wearing a seatbelt, should be able to claim damages for facial injuries caused by
another driver's negligence; the illegality there, failure to wear a seatbelt, is trivial.
73 Law Commission, op cit. This is similar to the Commission's earlier proposals relating to illegality
in contract and trusts (see Illegal Transactions: The Effect a/Illegality on Contracts and Trusts,
Consultation Paper No 154), the reason being that a single regime in relation to the defence would, in
the Commission's view, further their aims: "to review the law, with a view to its systematic
development and reform, including the elimination of anomalies and generally the simplification ... of
the law" (para 5.12, Law Commission No 160; see also the Law Commissions Aet 1965, s 3(1».
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Conclusion
As already stated, the defence of illegality is a general defence.
As such, it applies to the tort of negligence. The focus of this paper
has been on only the application of the defence to negligence
because the majority of the recent cases on its application to tort
have been cases on negligence. The two broad approaches to the
defence as regards negligence (the rigid approach and the flexible
approach) and the limitations on the defence, necessitated by
objections to its strict application, have been discussed above.
Although the defence (of illegality) undermines one goal of
damages in the law of tort, ie, compensation of the claimant, because
its effect is to make the claim unsuccessful, the appeal of its
justification cannot be denied. Compensation of claimants should
not prevail over the public conscience. In order to prevent the public
conscience being affronted and to preserve the good name of the law,
some personal injuries claims require application of the defence to
them, as do cases where the claimant and the defendant are involved
in a joint criminal enterprise.
The current law relating to the defence of illegality in tort
(negligence included), as admitted, has some unsatisfactory features.
But, as regards negligence specifically, it would be inappropriate to
replace the defence with contributory negligence or consent; in
addition, outright repeal of the defence is too extreme and is,
therefore, not supported here. The better option, as suggested above,
would be to retain the defence but refine it so as to make it more
acceptable than it is at the moment.
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